Oon Yeoh

In the aftermath of the political tsunami last Saturday that led to the Barisan Nasional losing its traditional two-thirds majority and five states, many of its leaders are saying the coalition needs to do some soul searching.

Since they are only now starting to do it, it might take some time for them to figure out exactly what went wrong. To help them along, I've compiled three key miscalculations the government made that led to vote swings in all three communities, Malay, Indian and Chinese.

The first miscalculation was overestimating the degree of Chinese tolerance for MCA and Gerakan leaders to continually appease UMNO.

When UMNO Youth Chief Hishamuddin Hussein raised the keris the first time, it sparked outraged amongst the non-Malay community, especially the Chinese. He did it a second time, which sparked further outrage and even MCA and Gerakan Youth leaders warned that this was damaging relations. Yet, he did it knowing full well how the non-Malay community felt about it. UMNO leaders could have told him to can his keris raising antics. Instead, Hishamuddin said the keris was here to stay, so people have to get used to it.

When UMNO Youth Deputy Chief  Khairy Jamaluddin went to Balik Pulau to denounce Koh Tsu Koon, then Penang's chief minister, for marginalizing the Malays, he was clearly trying to score brownie points with the Malay grassroots. But this was at the expense of Koh who was too timid to respond forcefully. Khairy's comments that the Chinese community would take advantage of the Malays if UMNO is weak further inflamed the situation. But did the senior leadership of Gerakan and MCA rebuke him? Did UMNO leaders? No.

These and many other instances where Gerakan and MCA failed to respond effectively and forcefully to the racist remarks and actions by certain UMNO figures led the Chinese community to abandon Gerakan and MCA in droves. In the case of Penang, the only Chinese-majority state, it was a wholesale rejection.

The second miscalculation was the government reaction to Hindraf. It's well known that Indians have been supporting the BN through thick and thin for the last half century. The Hindraf rally in itself was not the tipping point that turned things on its head, it was the government reaction to it that did.

Hindraf wanted to hold a rally to deliver a memo to the British High Commission. If the authorities had given them permission to do so, and allowed them to do their thing before asking them to peacefully disassemble, there would not have been a need for water cannons and tear gas.

And if the government had, in the aftermath of the massive turnout, invited Hindraf leaders and other prominent members of the Indian community to a discussion on what ails the Indian community and how to fix it, there would not have been such discontent amongst Indian voters.

Instead, the government opted for a "shock and awe" approach, initially charging 31 protestors for attempted murder, linking the Hindraf movement to terrorists and detaining five of its leaders under the ISA. This was not shock and awe but rubbing salt into the wound. It was a major miscalculation that backfired badly. Even people who did not agree with Hindraf felt sorry for them. Both DAP and Keadilan would go on to adopt "Makkal Sakti" as their rally cry.

The third miscalculation was assuming that Anwar Ibrahim was no longer relevant. By holding the election in March rather than late April or May, it denied him the chance to contest but  freed him to help out other candidates across the country.

If he were contesting a seat, Anwar would be spending the bulk of his time in his constituency to ensure victory just as Lim Guan Eng had to do in Bagan. Instead, Anwar was free to do what Lim Kit Siang (already an incumbent in Ipoh Timur) was doing, zig-zagging across the country, making up to six stops a day and four ceramahs a night. It was a punishing, grueling schedule but it worked. Anwar proved in this campaign that he had extremely long coattails that others could ride upon.

A big difference between 1999 and 2008 is that by now, the non-Malay crowds were no longer suspicious of Anwar. Back then, the Chinese, in particular, overwhelmingly voted BN because they were afraid of Reformasi. They might not have liked some of the things Dr. M did but as the old saying goes, "Better the devil you know than the devil you don't know".

In this election season, Anwar's appeal transcended race. He was a hit even in predominantly Chinese-attended rallies organized by DAP. It helped that he had publicly denounced the NEP as outdated and flawed and called for a new Malaysian deal that helped the needy regardless of race.

Ultimately, the government had no honest feedback mechanism that warned it of the actual situation on the ground. The BN government totally misread public sentiment.